Jeannie V. Hamilton v. Robert Earl Hamilton, George Poulsen, and Mrs. Geroge Poulsen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Jeannie V. Hamilton v. Robert Earl Hamilton,
George Poulsen, and Mrs. Geroge Poulsen : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jim R. Scarth; Attorney for Appellant.
Watkiss & Campbell; Harry D. Pugsley; Attorney for Respondents.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hamilton v. Hamilton, No. 14456.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1504
J 
^•'A*; CUPRZME COURT 
BRIEF A 
^9»n SME COURT OF THE 2 .. .II 
— 0 0 0 O 0 
JEANNIE V. HAMILTON, ) 
I'l.iuil "«f I' , ) 
Appellant, 
vs. ) 
ROBERT EARL HAMILTON, ) 
GEORGE POULSEN, and MRS. 
GEORGE POULSEN, ) 
Defendant1 *> 
Responded! -
Case No. 14456 
>r 
BI • .. APPELLANT 
- .-.>.• ) C O — 
ArJ , , :„',•, E K O M THE -Tn^MENT OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF
 ;.IL i'lFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, 
STAT*" n-p !TAH. 
- - -iVjOC-Ol ? 
JIM R. SCARTn, ..„quire 
Four Seasons Professional 
Plaza, Suitt 7 
P. 0. Box 577 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorney for Avr . ••. ] nnt 
A i i ' ' , ' F T 
Harry D .-. - - . " ; e 
Suite 41^ 
315 Easi '"'• •.. or, Sr.u.h 
Sail I-aK, i i ty , J rah «*-, , > I 
Attorney for Pvespondents 
'*--*U JuJfiMJ F D 
r\v' i ^  "'H. vi:o 
Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 4 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN UNDIVIDED ONE-
HALF INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY SOLD BY THE 
DEFENDANT, ROBERT EARL HAMILTON, AS A SINGLE 
MAN, TO RESPONDENTS, POULSENS; OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A 
ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
REAL PROPERTY. 4 
A. AT THE TIME OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT 
REAL PROPERTY, THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED 
TO A ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST. 4 . 
B. THERE EXISTS A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE 
WIFE'S STATUTORY INTEREST AND A PROPERTY 
DIVISION WHICH TAKES PLACE AT THE TIME 
OF DIVORCE. 5 
C. PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT THE STATUTORY 
INTEREST OF THE WIFE BE PROTECTED. 9 
D. THE INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE 
RESPONDENTS FOR THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
INDICATES A WILLINGNESS BY THE RESPONDENTS 
TO TAKE THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE 
INTERESTS OF THE APPELLANT. 10 
E. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF THIS TRANSACTION 
COULD ENCOURAGE VIOLATION OF THE CRIMINAL 
CODE. 11 
CONCLUSION 12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases Page 
Hilton v. Sloan, 37 U. 359, 108 P. 689 (1910). . . . 5,6 
In Re Madsen's Estate, 123, U. 327, 259 P. 2d 
595 (1953) T 7 ~ 4,7 
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 U. 573, 236 P. 2d 
Pinion v. Pinion, 92 U„ 255, 67 P. 2d 265 (1937) . . 6 
Wilson v. Wilson, 5 II. 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956. . 7 
Woolley v. Woolley, 113 U. 391, 195 P. 2d 743 (1948) 6 
Statutes 
Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)4,9 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)6,9 
Section 57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)7 
Section 74-1-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)9 
Section 76-20-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended) . .11 
Texts 
25 Am Jur 2d 192, Dower and Curtesy § 141 
25 Am Jur 2d 195, Dower and Curtesy § 147 
156 A. L. R. 515, 516 
5 
8 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNIE V. HAMILTON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. : 
ROBERT EARL HAMILTON, : 
GEORGE POULSEN, and MRS. 
GEORGE POULSEN, 
Defendants-Respondents. ' 
Case No.14456 
• 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant brought this action seeking a decree 
quieting claims of respondents to either 1) a 1/2 undivided 
interest in the subject real property, or 2) an undivided 
1/3 interest in the subject real property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was submitted to the Court by both 
parties on Motions for Summary Judgment with Depositions 
and Transcripts of Trial submitted as Affidavits. The 
District Court for the Fifth Judicial District in Millard 
County, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns presiding, entered 
its judgment decreeing respondents, George Poulsen, to be 
the owner of the subject real property and quieted title 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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against the claims of the appellant and granted respondent, 
George Poulsen, his costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court vacating the 
judgment rendered by the trial court and remanding the case 
for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was married to the defendant, Pvobert 
Earl Hamilton in November of 1964 in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
(T [1975] 3:18) (D 3:16). From approximately October, 1965 
through April, 1968, the Hamiltons resided in California. 
(D 3:17-20). 
On November 22, 1967 (T [1973] 8:8) the property 
in issue was purchased by defendant's (Pvobert Earl Hamilton) 
father, to-wit: Mr. A„ V. Hamilton, for the purchase price of 
$11,500.00 (T ]1973] 8:4) in the name of his-son, Pvobert 
Earl Hamilton, as and for the benefit of defendant's Pvobert 
Earl Hamilton, family. (T [1973] 11:5-14). 
In the Spring of 1968 the Hamilton family moved from 
California to Millard County, Utah (T [1973] 4:11-15) where 
they resided on the subject real property for approximately 
13 months until the appellant returned to California in May 
of 1969. (T [1973] 4:16-20). 
In Civil No. 5843 in Millard County, (T[1969]) the 
appellant pursued a divorce action against the defendant, 
Robert Earl Hamilton. The Complaint in said action was filed 
.-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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on May 28, 1969, (T [1975] 3:18-19) and the hearing on the 
case was held before the Honorable James P. McCune on Dec-
ember 8, 1969, (T [1969]; T [1975] 3:20-21). The Court found 
that the appellant was entitled to an interlocutory decree of 
divorce and orally granted such decree of divorce to her 
(T [1969] 32:9-16). The Court stated further that the decree 
would be final in all respects except as to the real property, 
including the x^ ater stock and equipment that goes with the 
farm itself (T [1975] 4:9-12 and T [1969] 38:25-30). The 
actual interlocutory decree of divorce was not signed and 
filed by Judge McCune until April 16, 1970, (T [1975] 5:11-
14) which decree purported to require that the real property 
here involved and including other real property owned by 
the parties and 50 shares of water ''should remain in joint 
ownership as tenants in common until the Court, by further 
Order, directs distribution or division of said property.ff 
(T [1975] 5:19-29). 
On March 13, 1970, (D 3:17-19) during the time the 
final division of the real property was pending, the 
defendant, Robert Earl Hamilton, representing himself to be 
"a single man11. (D 6:18-19, 10:17-21) conveyed by Warranty 
Deed to George J. Poulsen the real property involved in this 
litigation (T [1975] 4:22-25). The Warranty Deed was duly 
acknowledged by Robert E. Hamilton as a single man before 
Rodney Adams at Fillmore, Utah and was recorded in the 
office of the Millard County Recorder's Office on March 
-3-
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31, 1970 in Book 77 at page 519 (T [1975] 5: 15-16). Since 
that time the respondent George Poulsen has held title to 
and has claimed possession of said property, 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN UNDIVIDED 1/2 
INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY SOLD BY THE DEFENDANT, ROBERT 
EARL HAMILTON, AS A SINGLE MAN, TO RESPONDENTS, POULSENS; 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A 1/3 
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY. 
Ae At the time of the sale of the subject real 
property, the appellant was entitled to a 1/3 statutory 
interest. 
The statement of facts satisfy the requirements of 
Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
creating in appellant, as wife, an inchoate statute interest 
in one-third of the subject property. Said interest 
attached to the property when acquired, and was still 
attached to the property in March, 1970, when Robert Earl 
Hamilton deeded the property to the respondents, Poulsens. 
There is no evidence of any relinquishment of this statutory 
interest by the appellant, and no factual issue has been 
raised in this regard. 
The legal effect of the conveyance of the property 
by Robert Hamilton to the Poulsens in March, 1970, was to 
transfer the interest which he had, but subject to the 
statutory interest of the wife. As stated in In Re Madsen's 
-A-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Estate, 123 U. 327, 259 P. 2d (1953), at page 603: 
It (the wife's dower right) does not affect the seisin 
of the husband's grantee. He acquires the title that 
vested in the husband by the deed. The grantee has 
the legal title encumbered by the dower unless the wife 
has by proper written instrument freed the title of 
the encumbrance. 
Even though the trial court found that the Poulsens 
purchased without actual notice of appellant's statutory 
interest, this did not give them the status of bona fide 
purchasers for value or free the property from her claim. 
Nor are the wife's rights affected by the husband's 
representations that he is unmarried. This principle was 
affirmed in the case of Hilton v. Sloan, 37 U. 359, 103 P. 
689 (1910) at page 696. In that case, estoppel by the wife 
was found to be present, which defeated her dower claim. 
There is no evidence of estoppel in our case. 
Thus, the law is clear on the facts that at any point 
in time between the conveyance (March 31, 1970) and the 
signing of the Interlocutory Divorce Decree (April 14, 1970) 
any title to the property held by the Poulsens was subject 
to the appellant's statutory interest, x^ hether the Poulsens 
knew of it or not. 
B. There exists a correlation betx>7een the wife's 
statutory interest and a property division which takes place 
at the time of divorce. 
It may be conceded that as a general rule a divorce 
terminates the wife's statutory interest. 25 Am Jur 2d 192, 
Dower and Curtesy § 141. However, under Section 30-3-5, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), the court is vested 
with jurisdiction, at the time of divorce, to "make such 
orders in relation to . . .property . . .as may be equitable; 
• © © 
This statute has always been interpreted as permitting 
the Court, by Decree, to give the wife an interest in her 
husband1s property, as well as permitting the division of 
property held in both names. (For an example, see Pinion v. 
Pinion, 92 U. 255, 67 P., 2d 265 (1937). "If her husband 
has property, and she would go forth penniless, the situation 
would merit a property division.11) 
In fact, one-third is usually considered a fair 
proportion to award the wife in such divisions although 
the Court has discretion to modify this percentage depending 
on the facts of each particular case. Woolley v. Woolley, 
113 U. 391, 195 P. 2d 743 (1948), at page 745. (In the 
final divorce decree in the case at hand, the judge chose 
to go even further, granting a one-half undivided interest 
to the appellant.) 
This apparent correlation between the wife's statutory 
right and property division rights at divorce is further 
enhanced by examining the purpose of each. 
As to the wifefs statutory interest, it has been said 
that the law favors the wife's statutory right and is 
tenacious in protecting this right in her husband's estate. 
Hilton v. Sloan, 37 U. 359, 108 P. 689 (1910), at page 696. 
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As stated in In Re Madsenfs Estate, 123 U. 327, 259 P. 2d 
595 (1953), at page 602: 
We recognise it to be the fact that the right of 
dower or its statutory equivalent has always been 
highly favored in the law. It is one of the most 
ancient of our principles, dating back into 
antiquity . . . The wife's sustenance is a matter 
of great concern. The purpose of the law is to 
assure proper support of the widow after the death 
of her husband. 
The policy of the law granting property division to 
the wife upon divorce is substantially the same. In 
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 U. 573, 236 P. 2d 1066 (1951), 
the rule is stated that where there are sufficient assets 
and income to do so, a wife is entitled to be provided for 
according to her station in life and as demanded by her 
condition of health and lack of ability to work. The Utah 
Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule in Wilson v. Wilson, 
5 U. 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956) by stating it was the 
court's responsibility, in dividing property and awarding 
alimony in divorce judgment, flto endeavor to provide a 
just and equitable adjustment of parties' economic resources 
so that the parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy 
and useful basis." 
The actions of the defendant, Mr. Hamilton, in selling 
the subject property to the respondents, Poulsens, before 
the final divorce decree was signed, frusturated the efforts 
of the court to accomplish this end. 
In the case at hand, the Divorce Decree, as beteen 
the parties to it, awarded appellant a one-half undivided 
interest in the subject property, as a tenant in common, 
_7_ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Although the Decree is somewhat ambiguous as to whether 
joint tenancy or tenancy in common was intended, a fair 
construction of Section 57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended) favors tenancy in common. In either event, the 
appellant's interest would be the equivalent of an undivided 
one-half interest. 156 A. L. R, 515, 516. 
The wife's statutory right at the time of sale insured 
her a one-third interest in the property at that time. To 
allow the property to pass from the defendant, Robert Earl 
Hamilton, to the respondents, Poulsens, while Ignoring both 
appellant's statutory right and the rights afforded her 
under the property division at divorce seems unjustly harsh. 
It is submitted that the Court should hold that the 
appellant has at least a 337o interest in the property, 
representing the wife's statutory interest transmuted into 
a property division at: divorce. This author has been unable 
to locate any cases on this point in Utah. In other states, 
the relationship between the wife's statutory interest and 
divorce awards can be summarized as taking two forms. Either 
1) the wife's statutory interest after divorce, or 2) the 
wife's statutory interest by an award of lump-sum alimony, 
or some other provision. In either case, it is inferentially 
recognized that the two interests are related, and that the 
overriding concern of each is to provide for the wife. 25 Am 
Jur 2d 195, Dower and Curtesy § 147. 
Defendants are really not prejudiced in any way be 
a holding that a property award in a divorce case perpetuates 
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and family, and to provide for them. At the trial, A, V. 
Hamilton, father of the defendant, Robert Hamilton, 
testified that he provided the money to buy the property 
in issue "for the benefit of the Hamilton family, for the 
wife and children/1 (Transcript, P. 7, lines 28 and 29). 
He put it in his son's name alone, on advice of counsel 
that the wife would have a statutory right and the family 
interest would therefore be protected, (Transcript, P. 3, 
lines 27-30 and P. 9, lines 1-4). 
D. The inadequate consideration paid by the 
respondents for the subject property indicates a willingness 
by the respondents to take the property subject to the 
interests of the appellant. 
The respondents Poulsens claim they paid for the 
land with $3,500.00 cash (D 4 : 21-23) and a truck and 
trailer which were 13 and 17 years old, purchased earlier 
by the Poulsens for $7,500.00, but which were valued for 
consideration purposes at $8,500.00! (Interrogatories, 
answers on February 16, 1972). At the trial on June 25, 
1973, the appraiser Ken Esplin valued the real property at 
$38,000.00 plus. (T [1973] 18 ; 11-15). Thus, even 
assuming the old truck and trailer to be worth what 
respondents claim, they still bought the property for only 
30% of its true value. 
Respondents Poulsen knew, prior to their purchase 
of the land from Robert Hamilton, that he had been married,. 
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and even inquired as to the whereabouts of his wife. (D 6 
1. 18). Hamilton told him he was divorced that his wife 
left and went to California. Poulsen testified that he told 
Hamilton "if he was still married, he couldn't sell the 
property." (D 11 1. 2). The matter was brought up again 
by Poulsenfs accountant at the time of closing (D 13 1. 8). 
No contact was ever signed, and Poulsen made no effort to 
verify Hamilton's statement regarding the status of the 
divorce, though it would have been very easy to do so. 
(D 12). Under such circumstances, Poulsen should have been 
put on inquiry, and charged with notice of what inquiry 
at that time would have revealed, to-wit: that the seller 
was not divorced, that the land was still subject to the 
wife's statutory interest, and that the wife had asked the 
Court for a one-half interest in the property. The gross 
inadequacy of consideration, and the haste and informal 
nature of the sale all suggest that the Poulsens may have 
suspected the true state of affairs, and were willing to 
gamble on title for the low price they were paying. 
E. Judicial acceptance of this transaction could 
encourage violation of the criminal code. 
One other consideration which may be mentioned is 
that Section 76-20-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
makes it a felony for a married man to falsely represent 
himself as unmarried, and under such representation, wilfully 
convey real estate in Utah without the consent of his wife, 
-11-
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when such consent is necessary to relinquish her inchoate 
statutory interest. If a husband is permitted, on the civil 
side of the law, to succeed in cutting off his wifefs 
rights by doing this, it will only encourage more widespread 
violation of this criminal statute. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing statutes and authorities, 
it is submitted that the Court should adopt a rule, which 
protects the family, by holding that: 
(A) Under the circumstances of this case, respondents 
Poulsen were charged with notice of the then pending 
Hamilton divorce, and have taken title only to the interest 
that was subsequently awarded to Robert Hamilton, to-wit: 
an undivided one-half interest as a tenant in common. 
(B) In the alternative, and should the Court not 
make the foregoing ruling, it is submitted the Court should 
find that the Defendants took title subject to appellant's 
interest of one-third, and that such interest has been 
converted by virtue of the divorce decree, pro tanto, into 
a one-third interest in the real property, with the right 
of appellant to recover the difference between said one-
third and one-half (or one-sixth of the proceeds or reason-
able market value of the property) from her husband, Robert 
Earl Hamilton. 
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